The creators of the atomic bomb - who are they. Five stages in the creation of the first Soviet atomic bomb

The creation of the Soviet nuclear bomb, in terms of the complexity of scientific, technical and engineering tasks, is a significant, truly unique event that influenced the balance of political forces in the world after World War II. The solution of this problem in our country, which has not yet recovered from the terrible destruction and shocks of four war years, became possible as a result of the heroic efforts of scientists, production organizers, engineers, workers and the whole people. The implementation of the Soviet nuclear project required a real scientific, technological and industrial revolution, which led to the emergence of the domestic nuclear industry. This labor feat paid off. Having mastered the secrets of the production of nuclear weapons, our Motherland for many years ensured the military-defense parity of the two leading states of the world - the USSR and the USA. The nuclear shield, the first link of which was the legendary product RDS-1, still protects Russia today.
I. Kurchatov was appointed head of the Atomic Project. From the end of 1942, he began to gather scientists and specialists needed to solve the problem. Initially, the general leadership of the atomic problem was carried out by V. Molotov. But on August 20, 1945 (a few days after the atomic bombing of Japanese cities), the State Defense Committee decided to create a Special Committee, headed by L. Beria. It was he who began to lead the Soviet atomic project.
The first domestic atomic bomb had the official designation RDS-1. It was deciphered in different ways: “Russia does it itself”, “The Motherland gives Stalin”, etc. But in the official resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 21, 1946, the RDS received the wording - “Jet engine “C””.
The tactical and technical assignment (TTZ) indicated that the atomic bomb was being developed in two versions: using "heavy fuel" (plutonium) and using "light fuel" (uranium-235). The writing of technical specifications for RDS-1 and the subsequent development of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 was carried out taking into account the available materials according to the scheme of the US plutonium bomb tested in 1945. These materials were provided by Soviet foreign intelligence. An important source of information was K. Fuchs, a German physicist, a participant in the work on the nuclear programs of the USA and England.
Intelligence materials on the US plutonium bomb made it possible to avoid a number of mistakes in the creation of the RDS-1, significantly reduce the time for its development, and reduce costs. At the same time, it was clear from the very beginning that many of the technical solutions of the American prototype were not the best. Even at the initial stages, Soviet specialists could offer the best solutions for both the charge as a whole and its individual components. But the unconditional demand of the country's leadership was to get a working bomb with a guarantee and with the least risk by the time it was first tested.
The nuclear bomb was to be made in the form of an aerial bomb weighing no more than 5 tons, no more than 1.5 meters in diameter and no more than 5 meters long. These restrictions were due to the fact that the bomb was developed in relation to the TU-4 aircraft, the bomb bay of which allowed the placement of a "product" with a diameter of no more than 1.5 meters.
As the work progressed, the need for a special research organization for the design and development of the “product” itself became obvious. A number of studies carried out by Laboratory N2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences required their deployment in a "remote and isolated place." This meant: it was necessary to create a special research and production center for the development of the atomic bomb.

Creation of KB-11

April 9, 1946 A closed resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted on the creation of a Design Bureau (KB-11) at Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences. P. Zernov was appointed head of KB-11, Yu. Khariton was appointed chief designer.

The Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 21, 1946 determined the strict deadlines for the creation of the object: the first stage was to be commissioned on October 1, 1946, the second - on May 1, 1947. The construction of KB-11 (“facility”) was entrusted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. The "object" was supposed to occupy up to 100 sq. kilometers of forests in the zone of the Mordovian Reserve and up to 10 sq. kilometers in the Gorky region.
Construction was carried out without projects and preliminary estimates, the cost of work was taken at actual costs. The team of builders was formed with the involvement of a "special contingent" - this is how prisoners were designated in official documents. The government created special conditions for the provision of construction. Nevertheless, the construction was difficult, the first production buildings were ready only at the beginning of 1947. Some of the laboratories were located in monastic buildings.

The amount of construction work was great. Plant N 550 was to be reconstructed for the construction of a pilot plant on the existing premises. The power plant needed updating. It was necessary to build a foundry and press shop for working with explosives, as well as a number of buildings for experimental laboratories, test towers, casemates, warehouses. To carry out blasting, it was necessary to clear and equip large areas in the forest.
At the initial stage, there were no special premises for research laboratories - scientists were to occupy twenty rooms in the main design building. The designers, as well as the administrative services of KB-11, were to be accommodated in the reconstructed premises of the former monastery. The need to create conditions for arriving specialists and workers made it necessary to pay more and more attention to the residential village, which gradually acquired the features of small town. Simultaneously with the construction of housing, a medical town was erected, a library, a cinema club, a stadium, a park and a theater were built.

On February 17, 1947, by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR signed by Stalin, KB-11 was classified as a special security enterprise with the transformation of its territory into a closed security zone. Sarov was withdrawn from the administrative subordination of the Mordovian ASSR and excluded from all accounting materials. In the summer of 1947, the perimeter of the zone was taken under military guard.

Work in KB-11

The mobilization of specialists to the nuclear center was carried out regardless of their departmental affiliation. The leaders of KB-11 were looking for young and promising scientists, engineers, workers in literally all institutions and organizations of the country. All candidates for work in KB-11 underwent a special check in the state security services.
The creation of atomic weapons was the result of the work of a large team. But it did not consist of faceless "staff units", but of bright personalities, many of whom left a noticeable mark in the history of domestic and world science. A significant potential was concentrated here, both scientific, design, and performing, working.

In 1947, 36 researchers arrived at KB-11. They were seconded from various institutes, mainly from the USSR Academy of Sciences: the Institute of Chemical Physics, Laboratory N2, NII-6 and the Institute of Mechanical Engineering. In 1947, 86 engineering and technical workers worked in KB-11.
Taking into account the problems that had to be solved in KB-11, the order of formation of its main structural divisions was outlined. The first research laboratories began to work in the spring of 1947 in the following areas:
laboratory N1 (head - M. Ya. Vasiliev) - testing structural elements a charge of explosives providing a spherically converging detonation wave;
laboratory N2 (A. F. Belyaev) - research on explosive detonation;
laboratory N3 (V. A. Tsukerman) - X-ray studies of explosive processes;
laboratory N4 (L.V. Altshuler) - determination of the equations of state;
laboratory N5 (K. I. Shchelkin) - full-scale tests;
laboratory N6 (E.K. Zavoisky) - measurements of compression of the CC;
laboratory N7 (A. Ya. Apin) - development of a neutron fuse;
Laboratory N8 (N. V. Ageev) - study of the properties and characteristics of plutonium and uranium for use in bomb design.
The beginning of full-scale work of the first domestic atomic charge can be attributed to July 1946. During this period, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 21, 1946, Yu. B. Khariton prepared the "Tactical and technical assignment for the atomic bomb."

The TTZ indicated that the atomic bomb was being developed in two versions. In the first of them, the working substance should be plutonium (RDS-1), in the second - uranium-235 (RDS-2). In a plutonium bomb, the transition through the critical state must be achieved by symmetrical compression of plutonium, which has the shape of a ball, with a conventional explosive (implosion variant). In the second variant, the transition through the critical state is ensured by the combination of masses of uranium-235 with the help of an explosive (“cannon variant”).
At the beginning of 1947, the formation of design units began. Initially, all design work was concentrated in a single scientific and design sector (NKS) KB-11, which was headed by V. A. Turbiner.
The intensity of work in KB-11 from the very beginning was very high and constantly increased, since the initial plans, very extensive from the very beginning, increased every day in volume and depth of study.
Explosive experiments with large explosive charges began in the spring of 1947 at the KB-11 experimental sites that were still under construction. The greatest volume of research was to be carried out in the gas-dynamic sector. In this regard, a large number of specialists were sent there in 1947: K. I. Shchelkin, L. V. Altshuler, V. K. Bobolev, S. N. Matveev, V. M. Nekrutkin, P. I. Roy, N. D. Kazachenko, V. I. Zhuchikhin, A. T. Zavgorodniy, K. K. Krupnikov, B. N. Ledenev, V. M. Malygin, V. M. Bezotosny, D. M. Tarasov, K. I. Panevkin, B. A. Terletskaya and others.
Experimental studies of charge gas dynamics were carried out under the direction of K. I. Shchelkin, and theoretical questions were developed by a group in Moscow headed by Ya. B. Zeldovich. The work was carried out in close cooperation with designers and technologists.

A.Ya. Apin, V.A. Aleksandrovich and designer A.I. Abramov. To achieve the desired result, it was necessary to master a new technology for using polonium, which has a fairly high radioactivity. At the same time, it was necessary to develop a complex system for protecting materials in contact with polonium from its alpha radiation.
In KB-11, for a long time, research and design work were carried out on the most precise element of the charge-detonator cap. This important direction was led by A.Ya. Apin, I.P. Sukhov, M.I. Puzyrev, I.P. Kolesov and others. The development of research required a territorial approach of theoretical physicists to the research, design and production base of KB-11. Since March 1948, a theoretical department began to form in KB-11 under the leadership of Ya.B. Zeldovich.
Due to the great urgency and high complexity work in KB-11, new laboratories and production sites began to be created, and seconded to them the best specialists The Soviet Union mastered new high standards and harsh production conditions.

The plans drawn up in 1946 could not take into account many of the difficulties that opened up to the participants in the atomic project as they moved forward. Decree SM N 234-98 ss / op dated February 8, 1948. The production time for the RDS-1 charge was assigned to more late deadline- by the time the plutonium charge parts are ready at Combine N 817.
With regard to the RDS-2 variant, by that time it became clear that it would not be expedient to bring it to the testing stage because of the relatively low efficiency of this variant compared to the cost of nuclear materials. Work on the RDS-2 was terminated in mid-1948.

According to the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 10, 1948, they were appointed: the first deputy chief designer of the "object" - Schelkin Kirill Ivanovich; deputies of the chief designer of the facility - Alferov Vladimir Ivanovich, Dukhov Nikolay Leonidovich.
In February 1948, 11 scientific laboratories were working hard at KB-11, including theoreticians led by Ya.B. Zeldovich, who moved to the facility from Moscow. His group included D. D. Frank-Kamenetsky, N. D. Dmitriev, V. Yu. Gavrilov. The experimenters did not lag behind the theorists. The most important work was carried out in the departments of KB-11, which were responsible for detonating a nuclear charge. Its design was clear, the detonation mechanism too. In theory. In practice, it was necessary to carry out checks again and again, to carry out complex experiments.
The production workers also worked very actively - those who had to translate the ideas of scientists and designers into reality. In July 1947, A.K. Bessarabenko was appointed head of the plant, N.A. Petrov became the chief engineer, P.D. Panasyuk, V.D. Shcheglov, A.I. Novitsky, G.A. Savosin, A.Ya. Ignatiev, V. S. Lyubertsev.

In 1947, a second experimental plant appeared in the structure of KB-11 - for the production of parts from explosives, the assembly of experimental units of the product and the solution of many other important tasks. The results of calculations and design studies were quickly embodied in specific parts, assemblies, blocks. This, by the highest standards, responsible work was carried out by two plants at KB-11. Plant N 1 carried out the manufacture of many parts and assemblies of the RDS-1 and then their assembly. Plant No. 2 (A. Ya. Malsky became its director) was engaged in the practical solution of various problems related to the production and processing of parts from explosives. The assembly of the charge from explosives was carried out in the workshop, which was led by M. A. Kvasov.

Each passed stage set new tasks for researchers, designers, engineers, workers. People worked for 14-16 hours a day, completely surrendering to the cause. On August 5, 1949, a plutonium charge manufactured at Combine No. 817 was accepted by a commission headed by Khariton and then sent by letter train to KB-11. Here, on the night of August 10-11, a control assembly of a nuclear charge was carried out. She showed: RDS-1 meets the technical requirements, the product is suitable for testing at the site.

The first nuclear test took place on July 16, 1945 in the United States. The nuclear weapons program was codenamed Manhattan. The tests took place in the desert, in a state of complete secrecy. Even the correspondence between scientists and relatives was under close scrutiny by intelligence officers.

It is also interesting that Truman, being in the position of vice president, knew nothing about the ongoing research. He learned about the existence of the American nuclear project only after being elected president.

The Americans were the first to develop and test nuclear weapons, but other countries also carried out work of a similar format. The American scientist Robert Oppenheimer and his Soviet colleague Igor Kurchatov are considered the fathers of the new deadly weapon. At the same time, it is worth considering that not only they worked on the creation of a nuclear bomb. Scientists from many countries of the world worked on the development of new weapons.

German physicists were the first to solve this problem. Back in 1938, two famous scientists Fritz Strassmann and Otto Hahn performed the first operation in history to split the atomic nucleus of uranium. A few months later, a team of scientists from the University of Hamburg sent a message to the government. It reported that the creation of a new "explosive" is theoretically possible. Separately, it was emphasized that the state that receives it first will have complete military superiority.

The Germans achieved serious success, but failed to bring the research to its logical end. As a result, the initiative was seized by the Americans. The history of the emergence of the Soviet atomic project is closely connected with the work of the special services. It was thanks to them that the USSR was eventually able to develop and test nuclear weapons of its own production. We will talk about this below.

The role of intelligence in the development of an atomic charge

The Soviet military leadership learned about the existence of the American Manhattan project back in 1941. Then the intelligence of our country received a message from its agents that the US government had organized a group of scientists working on the creation of a new "explosive" with enormous power. Meaning "uranium bomb". This is how nuclear weapons were originally called.

The history of the Potsdam Conference deserves special attention, at which Stalin was informed about the successful testing of the atomic bomb by the Americans. The reaction of the Soviet leader was quite restrained. He, in his usual calm tone, thanked for the information provided, but did not comment on it. Churchill and Truman decided that the Soviet leader did not fully understand what exactly he had been told.

However, the Soviet leader was well informed. The Foreign Intelligence Service constantly informed him that the Allies were developing a bomb of enormous power. After talking with Truman and Churchill, he contacted the physicist Kurchatov, who headed the Soviet atomic project, and ordered to speed up the development of nuclear weapons.

Of course, the information provided by intelligence contributed to the early development of new technology by the Soviet Union. However, to say that it was decisive is extremely incorrect. At the same time, the leading Soviet scientists have repeatedly stated the importance of information obtained by reconnaissance.

Kurchatov for the entire time of the development of nuclear weapons has repeatedly praised the information received. The Foreign Intelligence Service provided him with more than a thousand sheets of valuable data, which certainly helped speed up the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb.

Building a bomb in the USSR

The USSR began conducting research necessary for the production of nuclear weapons in 1942. It was then that Kurchatov gathered a large number of specialists to conduct research in this area. Initially, the nuclear project was supervised by Molotov. But after the explosions in Japanese cities, a Special Committee was established. Beria became its head. It was this structure that began to oversee the development of an atomic charge.

Domestic nuclear bomb received the name RDS-1. The weapon was developed in two forms. The first was designed to use plutonium, and the other uranium-235. The development of the Soviet atomic charge was carried out on the basis of the available information about the plutonium bomb created in the USA. Most of the information was obtained by foreign intelligence from the German scientist Fuchs. As mentioned above, this information significantly accelerated the course of research. More information can be found at biblioatom.ru.

Test of the first atomic charge in the USSR

The Soviet atomic charge was first tested on August 29, 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site in the Kazakh SSR. Physicist Kurchatov officially ordered the tests to be carried out at eight in the morning. In advance, a charge and special neutron fuses were brought to the test site. At midnight, the assembly of the RDS-1 was completed. The procedure was completed only by three o'clock in the morning.

Then at six in the morning, the finished device was raised to a special test tower. As a result of deteriorating weather conditions, the management decided to postpone the explosion one hour earlier than originally scheduled.

At seven o'clock in the morning there was a test. Twenty minutes later, two tanks equipped with protective plates were sent to the test site. Their task was to conduct reconnaissance. The data obtained testified: all existing buildings were destroyed. The soil is infected and turned into a solid crust. The power of the charge was twenty-two kilotons.

Conclusion

The successful test of a Soviet nuclear weapon ushered in a new era. The USSR was able to overcome the US monopoly on the production of new weapons. As a result Soviet Union became the second nuclear state in the world. This contributed to the strengthening of the country's defense capability. The development of the atomic charge made it possible to create a new balance of power in the world. The contribution of the Soviet Union to the development of nuclear physics as a science is difficult to overestimate. It was in the USSR that technologies were developed, which subsequently began to be used all over the world.

On August 29, 1949, at exactly 7 o'clock, a dazzling light illuminated the area near the city of Semipalatinsk. An event of extreme importance took place: the USSR tested the first atomic bomb.

This event was preceded by a long and difficult work of physicists of the KB-11 design bureau under the scientific supervision of the first director of the Institute of Atomic Energy, the chief scientific leader of the atomic problem in the USSR, Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov, and one of the founders of nuclear physics in the USSR, Yuli Borisovich Khariton.

nuclear project

Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov

The Soviet nuclear project started on September 28, 1942. It was on this day that the order of the State Defense Committee No. 2352 “On the organization of work on uranium” appeared. And already on February 11, 1943, a decision was made to establish Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which was supposed to be engaged in the study of atomic energy. Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov is appointed as the head of the atomic project. And in April 1943, a special design bureau KB-11 was created at Laboratory No. 2, which was engaged in the development of nuclear weapons. Julius Borisovich Khariton becomes its leader.

The creation of materials and technologies for the first atomic bomb took place in a very intense mode, in difficult post-war conditions. Many devices, tools, equipment had to be invented and created in the process of work by the team itself.

By that time, scientists had already imagined what an atomic bomb should look like. A certain amount of fissile material under the action of neutrons had to be concentrated very quickly in one place. As a result of fission, new neutrons were formed, the process of decay of atoms grew like an avalanche. There was a chain reaction with the release of a huge amount of energy. The result was an explosion.

Creation of the atomic bomb

Atomic bomb explosion

The scientists faced very important tasks.

First of all, it was necessary to explore deposits of uranium ores, organize their extraction and processing. It must be said that work on the search for new deposits of uranium ores was accelerated as early as 1940. But in natural uranium, the amount of the uranium-235 isotope suitable for a chain reaction is very small. It is only 0.71%. And the uranium itself in the ore contains only 1%. Therefore, it was necessary to solve the problem of uranium enrichment.

In addition, it was necessary to substantiate, calculate and build the first physical reactor in the USSR, to create the first industrial nuclear reactor that would produce enough plutonium to manufacture a nuclear charge. The next step was to isolate the plutonium, convert it into a metallic form, and make a plutonium charge. And this is by no means a complete list of what needed to be done.

And all these complex works were completed. New industrial technologies and productions were created. Pure metallic uranium, graphite and other special materials have been obtained.

As a result, the first prototype of the Soviet atomic bomb was ready in August 1949. It was named RDS-1. It meant "The Motherland does it herself."

On August 5, 1949, a commission headed by Yu.B. Khariton. The charge arrived at KB-11 by letter train. On the night of August 10-11, a control collection of a nuclear charge was carried out.

After that, everything was dismantled, inspected, packed and prepared for shipment to the landfill near Semipalatinsk, the construction of which began in 1947 and was completed in July 1949. In just 2 years, a colossal amount of work was completed at the landfill, and with the highest quality.

So, the USSR created its atomic bomb only 4 years later than the United States, which could not believe that such a complex weapon could be created by someone else besides them.

Started almost from scratch, in the complete absence of the necessary knowledge and experience, hardest job ended in success. From now on, the USSR possessed powerful weapons capable of deterring the use of the atomic bomb by other countries with destructive purposes. And who knows, if not for this, the tragedy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki could well have been repeated elsewhere in the world.

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Research in the field of nuclear physics in the USSR has been carried out since 1918. In 1937, the first cyclotron in Europe was launched at the Radium Institute in Leningrad. On November 25, 1938, by a decree of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences (AN) of the USSR, a permanent commission on the atomic nucleus was established. It included Sergei Ivanovich Vavilov, Abram Iofe, Abram Alikhanov, Igor Kurchatov and others (in 1940 they were joined by Vitaly Khlopin and Isai Gurevich). By this time, nuclear research was carried out in more than ten scientific institutes. In the same year, the Commission on Heavy Water was formed at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, later transformed into the Commission on Isotopes.

The first atomic bomb was given the designation RDS-1. This name comes from a government decree, where the atomic bomb was coded as "special jet engine", abbreviated as RDS. The designation RDS-1 became widely used after the testing of the first atomic bomb and was deciphered in different ways: "Stalin's jet engine", "Russia makes itself."

In September 1939, construction began on a powerful cyclotron in Leningrad, and in April 1940, it was decided to build a pilot plant for the production of approximately 15 kg of heavy water per year. But due to the outbreak of war, these plans were not realized. In May 1940, N. Semenov, Ya. Zel'dovich, Yu. Khariton (Institute of Chemical Physics) proposed a theory of the development of a nuclear chain reaction in uranium. In the same year, work was accelerated to search for new deposits of uranium ores. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, many physicists already imagined what an atomic bomb should look like in general terms. The idea is to quickly concentrate in one place a certain (more than a critical mass) amount of fissile under the action of neutrons (with the emission of new neutrons) material. After that, an avalanche-like increase in the number of decays of atoms will begin in it - a chain reaction with the release of a huge amount of energy - an explosion will occur. The problem was to obtain a sufficient amount of fissile material. The only such substance found in nature in acceptable quantities is an isotope of uranium with a mass number (the total number of protons and neutrons in the nucleus) of 235 (uranium-235). In natural uranium, the content of this isotope does not exceed 0.71% (99.28% uranium-238), moreover, the content of natural uranium in the ore is at best 1%. Separation of uranium-235 from natural uranium was a rather difficult problem. The alternative to uranium, as it soon became clear, was plutonium-239. It practically does not occur in nature (it is 100 times less than uranium-235). It is possible to obtain it in an acceptable concentration in nuclear reactors by irradiating uranium-238 with neutrons. The construction of such a reactor presented another problem.

The explosion of RDS-1 on August 29, 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site. The power of the bomb was more than 20 kt. The 37-meter tower, on which the bomb was installed, was erased, and a funnel 3 m in diameter and 1.5 m deep formed under it, covered with a melted glass-like substance.

The third problem was how it is possible to collect in one place the necessary mass of fissile material. In the process of even a very rapid approach of subcritical parts, fission reactions begin in them. The energy released in this case may not allow most of the atoms to "take part" in the fission process, and they will fly apart without having time to react.

In 1940, V. Spinel and V. Maslov from the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology filed an application for the invention of an atomic munition based on the use of a chain reaction of spontaneous fission of the supercritical mass of uranium-235, which is formed from several subcritical ones, separated by an explosive impervious to neutrons, destroyed by detonation ( although the "operability" of such a charge is highly doubtful, a certificate for the invention was nevertheless received, but only in 1946). The Americans for their first bombs intended to use the so-called cannon scheme. It actually used a cannon barrel with the help of which one subcritical part of the fissile material was fired into another (it soon became clear that such a scheme was not suitable for plutonium due to insufficient convergence speed).

On April 15, 1941, the Council issued a resolution People's Commissars(SNK) on the construction of a powerful cyclotron in Moscow. But after the start of the Great Patriotic War, almost all work in the field of nuclear physics was stopped. Many nuclear physicists ended up at the front or were refocused on other, as it seemed then, more pressing topics.

Since 1939, both the GRU of the Red Army and the 1st Directorate of the NKVD have been collecting information on the nuclear issue. The first message about plans to create an atomic bomb came from D. Cairncross in October 1940. This issue was discussed in the British Science Committee, where Cairncross worked. In the summer of 1941, the Tube Alloys project to create an atomic bomb was approved. By the beginning of the war, England was one of the leaders in nuclear research, largely due to German scientists who fled here when Hitler came to power, one of them was K. Fuchs, a member of the KKE. In the autumn of 1941, he went to the Soviet embassy and reported that he had important information about a powerful new weapon. To communicate with him, S. Kramer and radio operator "Sonya" - R. Kuchinskaya were singled out. The first radiograms to Moscow contained information about the gas diffusion method for separating uranium isotopes and about a plant in Wales being built for this purpose. After six transmissions, communication with Fuchs was interrupted. At the end of 1943, the Soviet intelligence officer in the United States Semyonov ("Twain") reported that in Chicago, E. Fermi carried out the first nuclear chain reaction. The information came from the physicist Pontecorvo. At the same time, closed scientific works of Western scientists on atomic energy for 1940-1942 were received from England through foreign intelligence. They confirmed that great progress had been made in building the atomic bomb. Wife also worked for intelligence famous sculptor Konenkov, who, having become close to the outstanding physicists Oppenheimer and Einstein, influenced them for a long time. Another resident in the United States, L. Zarubina, found a way to L. Szilard and was a member of Oppenheimer's circle of people. With their help, it was possible to introduce reliable agents into Oak Ridge, Los Alamos and the Chicago Laboratory - the centers of American nuclear research. In 1944, information on the American atomic bomb was transmitted to Soviet intelligence by: K. Fuchs, T. Hall, S. Sake, B. Pontecorvo, D. Greenglass and the Rosenbergs.

In early February 1944, the People's Commissar of the NKVD, L. Beria, held an extended meeting of the First Soviet Nuclear Bomb and its chief designer, Yu. Khariton, of the heads of the NKVD intelligence. During the meeting, a decision was made to coordinate the collection of information on the atomic problem. coming through the NKVD and the GRU of the Red Army. and its generalizations create a "C" department. On September 27, 1945, the department was organized, the leadership was entrusted to the commissioner of the State Security P. Sudoplatov. In January 1945, Fuchs transmitted a description of the design of the first atomic bomb. Among other things, intelligence obtained materials on the electromagnetic separation of uranium isotopes, data on the operation of the first reactors, specifications for the production of uranium and plutonium bombs, data on the design of the system of focusing explosive lenses and the size of the critical mass of uranium and plutonium, on plutonium-240, on time and sequence operations for the manufacture and assembly of the bomb, the method of actuating the bomb initiator; on the construction of plants for the separation of isotopes, as well as diary entries about the first test explosion American bomb in July 1945.

Information coming through intelligence channels facilitated and accelerated the work of Soviet scientists. Western experts believed that the atomic bomb in the USSR could be created no earlier than in 1954-1955, but its first test took place already in August 1949.

In April 1942, People's Commissar chemical industry M. Pervukhin, by order of Stalin, was acquainted with the materials on the work on the atomic bomb abroad. Pervukhin proposed to select a group of specialists to evaluate the information presented in this report. On the recommendation of Ioffe, the group included young scientists Kurchatov, Alikhanov and I. Kikoin. On November 27, 1942, the State Defense Committee issued a resolution “On uranium mining”. The resolution provided for the creation of a special institute and the start of work on exploration, extraction and processing of raw materials. Beginning in 1943, the People's Commissariat for Non-Ferrous Metallurgy (NKCM) began mining and processing uranium ore at the Tabashar mine in Tajikistan with a plan of 4 tons of uranium salts per year. At the beginning of 1943, the previously mobilized scientists were recalled from the front.

In pursuance of the GKO resolution, on February 11, 1943, Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was organized, headed by Kurchatov (in 1949 it was renamed the Laboratory of Measuring Instruments of the USSR Academy of Sciences - LIPAN, in 1956 the Institute of Atomic Energy was created on its basis, and at present time is the RRC "Kurchatov Institute"), which was supposed to coordinate all work on the implementation of the nuclear project.

In 1944, Soviet intelligence received a guide to uranium-graphite reactors, which contained very valuable information on determining the parameters of the reactor. But the uranium needed to load even a small experimental nuclear reactor in the country did not yet exist. On September 28, 1944, the government ordered the USSR NKCM to hand over uranium and uranium salts to the State Fund and assigned the task of storing them to Laboratory No. 2. In November 1944, a large group of Soviet specialists, led by the head of the 4th special department of the NKVD V. Kravchenko, left Bulgaria, to study the results of geological exploration of the Goten deposit. On December 8, 1944, a GKO decree was issued on the transfer of mining and processing of uranium ores from the NKMTs to the jurisdiction of the NKVD of the 9th Directorate, created in the Main Directorate of Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises (GU GMP). In March 1945, Major General S. Yegorov, who had previously held the position of deputy. Head of the Main Directorate of Dalstroy. In January 1945, as part of the 9th Directorate, on the basis of separate laboratories of the State Institute of Rare Metals (Giredmet) and one of the defense plants, NII-9 (now VNIINM) was organized to study uranium deposits, solve the problems of processing uranium raw materials, obtaining metallic uranium and plutonium . By this time, about one and a half tons of uranium ore per week were coming from Bulgaria.

Since March 1945, after information was received through the channels of the NKGB from the United States about the scheme of an atomic bomb based on the principle of implosion (compression of fissile material by an explosion of a conventional explosive), work began on a new scheme that had obvious advantages over a cannon. In a note by V. Makhanev to Beria in April 1945 on the timing of the creation of an atomic bomb, it was said that the diffusion plant at Laboratory No. 2 for producing uranium-235 was supposed to be launched in 1947. Its productivity was supposed to be 25 kg of uranium per year, which should have been enough for two bombs (in fact, 65 kg of uranium-235 was required for the American uranium bomb).

During the battles for Berlin on May 5, 1945, the property of the Physical Institute of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society was discovered. On May 9, a commission headed by A. Zavenyagin was sent to Germany to search for scientists who worked there on the Uranium project and to accept materials on the uranium problem. A large group of German scientists was taken to the Soviet Union along with their families. Among them were Nobel laureates G. Hertz and N. Riehl, I. Kurchatov, professors R. Deppel, M. Vollmer, G. Pose, P. Thyssen, M. von Ardene, Gaib (only about two hundred specialists, 33 of them are doctors of science).

The creation of a nuclear explosive device using plutonium-239 required the construction of an industrial nuclear reactor for its development. Even a small experimental reactor required about 36 tons of metallic uranium, 9 tons of uranium dioxide and about 500 tons of the purest graphite. If the graphite problem was solved by August 1943, it was possible to develop and master a special technological process obtaining graphite of the required purity, and in May 1944 its production was launched at the Moscow Electrode Plant, then required amount there was no uranium in the country by the end of 1945. The first specifications for the manufacture of uranium dioxide and uranium metal for a research reactor were issued by Kurchatov in November 1944. In parallel with the creation of uranium-graphite reactors, work was carried out on reactors based on uranium and heavy water. The question arises why it was necessary to “disperse forces” in such a way and move simultaneously in several directions? Justifying the need for this, Kurchatov in his Report in 1947 cites the following figures. The number of bombs that could be obtained from 1000 tons of uranium ore different methods equal to 20 when using a uranium-graphite boiler, 50 - when using a diffusion method, 70 - when using an electromagnetic one, 40 - when using "heavy" water. At the same time, boilers with “heavy” water, although they have a number of significant drawbacks, have the advantage that they allow the use of thorium. Thus, although the uranium-graphite boiler made it possible to create an atomic bomb in as soon as possible, but had the worst result in terms of the completeness of the use of raw materials. Taking into account the experience of the United States, where gas diffusion was chosen from the four methods of uranium separation studied, on December 21, 1945, the government decided to build combines No. 813 (now the Ural Electro-Mechanical Plant in Novouralsk) to produce highly enriched uranium-235 by gas diffusion and (Chelyabinsk-40, now the chemical plant "Mayak" in the city of Ozersk) to produce plutonium.

In the spring of 1948, the two-year period allotted by Stalin for the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb expired. But by this time, not only bombs, there were no fissile materials for its production. By a government decree of February 8, 1948, a new deadline for the manufacture of the RDS-1 bomb was set - March 1, 1949.

The first industrial reactor "A" at Combine No. 817 was launched on June 19, 1948 (on June 22, 1948 it reached design capacity and was decommissioned only in 1987). To separate the produced plutonium from nuclear fuel, a radiochemical plant (Plant B) was built as part of Combine No. 817. The irradiated uranium blocks were dissolved and chemical methods separated plutonium from uranium. The concentrated plutonium solution was subjected to additional purification from highly active fission products in order to reduce its radiation activity when delivered to metallurgists. In April 1949, Plant V began manufacturing plutonium bomb parts using the NII-9 technology. At the same time, the first heavy water research reactor was launched. The development of the production of fissile materials was difficult with numerous accidents during the elimination of the consequences of which there were cases of overexposure of personnel (then no attention was paid to such trifles). By July, a set of parts for the plutonium charge was ready. To carry out physical measurements, a group of physicists led by Flerov went to the plant, and a group of theorists led by Zel'dovich went to the plant to process the results of these measurements, calculate the values ​​of efficiency and the probability of an incomplete explosion.

On August 5, 1949, a plutonium charge was accepted by a commission headed by Khariton and sent by letter train to KB-11. By this time, work on the creation of an explosive device was almost completed here. Here, on the night of August 10-11, a control assembly of a nuclear charge was carried out, which received the index 501 for the RDS-1 atomic bomb. After that, the device was dismantled, the parts were inspected, packed and prepared for shipment to the landfill. Thus, the Soviet atomic bomb was made in 2 years 8 months (in the USA it took 2 years 7 months).

The test of the first Soviet nuclear charge 501 was carried out on August 29, 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site (the device was located on the tower). The power of the explosion was 22 kt. The design of the charge repeated the American "Fat Man", although the electronic filling was of Soviet design. The atomic charge was a multilayer structure in which plutonium was transferred to a critical state by compression by a converging spherical detonation wave. In the center of the charge was placed 5 kg of plutonium, in the form of two hollow hemispheres, surrounded by a massive shell of uranium-238 (tamper). This shell The first Soviet nuclear bomb - the scheme served to inertially contain the nucleus swelling during the chain reaction, so that as much of the plutonium as possible had time to react and, in addition, served as a neutron reflector and moderator (low-energy neutrons are most effectively absorbed by plutonium nuclei, causing their fission ). The tamper was surrounded by an aluminum shell, which ensured uniform compression of the nuclear charge by the shock wave. A neutron initiator (fuse) was installed in the cavity of the plutonium core - a beryllium ball with a diameter of about 2 cm, covered with a thin layer of polonium-210. When the nuclear charge of the bomb is compressed, the nuclei of polonium and beryllium approach each other, and alpha particles emitted by radioactive polonium-210 knock out neutrons from beryllium, which initiate a chain nuclear fission reaction of plutonium-239. One of the most complex knots was an explosive charge consisting of two layers. The inner layer consisted of two hemispherical bases made of an alloy of TNT with RDX, the outer layer was assembled from individual elements that had different speed detonation. The outer layer, designed to form a spherical converging detonation wave at the base of the explosive, was called the focusing system.

For safety reasons, the installation of the node containing fissile material was carried out immediately before the charge was applied. To do this, in the spherical explosive charge there was a through conical hole, which was closed with a cork made of explosives, and in the outer and inner cases there were holes closed with lids. The power of the explosion was due to the fission of the nuclei of about a kilogram of plutonium, the remaining 4 kg did not have time to react and was uselessly sprayed. During the implementation of the RDS-1 creation program, many new ideas arose for improving nuclear charges (increasing the utilization factor of fissile material, reducing dimensions and weight). New samples of charges have become more powerful, more compact and "smarter" than the first.

Creation of the Soviet atomic bomb (military-strategic part of the "USSR Atomic Project")- the history of fundamental research, development of technologies and their practical implementation in the Soviet Union, aimed at creating weapons of mass destruction using nuclear energy. These events were stimulated to a large extent by the activities in this direction of scientific institutions and the military industry of the West, including in fascist Germany, and later on in the United States.

In 1930-1941, work was actively carried out in the nuclear field.

In this decade, fundamental radiochemical research was also carried out, without which any understanding of these problems, their development, and, even more so, their implementation, would be inconceivable. All-Union conferences of the USSR Academy of Sciences on nuclear physics were held, in which domestic and foreign researchers who worked not only in the field of atomic physics, but also in other related disciplines - geochemistry, physical chemistry, inorganic chemistry, etc., took part.

Science centers

Work, since the beginning of the 1920s, has been intensively developed at the Radium Institute and at the first Phystech (both in Leningrad), at the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology, and at the Institute of Chemical Physics in Moscow.

Academician V. G. Khlopin was considered an indisputable authority in this area. Also, a serious contribution was made, among many others, by the employees of the Radium Institute: G. A. Gamov, I. V. Kurchatov and L. V. Mysovsky (creators of the first cyclotron in Europe), Fritz Lange (created the first project - 1940), and also founder of the Institute of Chemical Physics N. N. Semyonov. The Soviet project was supervised by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. M. Molotov.

In 1941, research on atomic problems was classified. The German attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 largely led to the fact that in the USSR they were forced to reduce the volume of nuclear research, including research into the possibility of a fission chain reaction, while in the UK and the USA, work on this problem continued vigorously. .

The role of the activities of the Radium Institute

Meanwhile, the chronology of research carried out by the employees of the Radium Institute in Leningrad suggests that work in this direction was not completely curtailed, which was largely facilitated by pre-war fundamental research, and which affected their subsequent development, and, as will be clear from further - had paramount importance for the project as a whole; in retrospect, and looking ahead, we can state the following: back in 1938, the first laboratory of artificial radioactive elements in the USSR was created here (headed by A. E. Polesitsky); in 1939, the works of V. G. Khlopin, L. V. Mysovsky, A. P. Zhdanov, N. A. Perfilov and other researchers on the fission of a uranium nucleus under the action of neutrons were published; in 1940, G. N. Flerov and K. A. Petrzhak discovered the phenomena of spontaneous fission of heavy nuclei using uranium as an example; - under the chairmanship of V. G. Khlopin, the Uranium Commission of the USSR Academy of Sciences was formed, in 1942, during the evacuation of the institute, A. P. Zhdanov and L. V. Mysovsky discovered a new type of nuclear fission - the complete collapse of the atomic nucleus under the action of multiply charged particles of cosmic rays; in 1943, V. G. Khlopin sent a letter to the State Defense Committee and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, giving justification for the mandatory participation of the Radium Institute in the "uranium project"; - The Radium Institute was entrusted with the development of a technology for separating eka-rhenium (Z = 93) and eka-osmium (Z = 94) from neutron-irradiated uranium; in 1945, with the help of a cyclotron, the first domestic preparation of plutonium in pulsed quantities was obtained; - under the leadership of B. S. Dzhelepov, work began on beta and gamma spectroscopy of nuclei; - The Radium Institute was entrusted with: verification and testing of plutonium separation methods, study of the chemistry of plutonium, development of a technological scheme for the separation of plutonium from irradiated uranium, issuance of technological data to the plant; in 1946, the development of the first domestic technology for obtaining plutonium from irradiated uranium was completed (headed by V. G. Khlopin); The Radium Institute, together with the GIPH designers (Ya. I. Zilberman, N. K. Khovansky), issued the technological part of the design assignment for object “B” (“Blue Book”), containing all the necessary primary data for the design of a radiochemical plant; in 1947, G. M. Tolmachev developed a radiochemical method for determining the utilization factor of nuclear fuel in nuclear explosions; in 1948, under the leadership of the Radium Institute and on the basis of the acetate precipitation technology developed by it, the first radiochemical plant in the USSR near Chelyabinsk was launched; by 1949, the amount of plutonium necessary for testing nuclear weapons had been produced; - the first development of polonium-beryllium sources as a fuse for nuclear bombs of the first generation was carried out (headed by D. M. Ziv).

Foreign intelligence information

As early as September 1941, the USSR began to receive intelligence information about the conduct of intensive secret research work in the UK and the USA aimed at developing methods for using atomic energy for military purposes and creating atomic bombs of enormous destructive power. Among the most important documents received back in 1941 by Soviet intelligence is the report of the British "MAUD Committee". From the materials of this report, received through the intelligence channels of the NKVD of the USSR from Donald McLean, it followed that the creation of an atomic bomb was real, that it could probably be created even before the end of the war and, therefore, influence its course.

Intelligence information about work on the problem of atomic energy abroad, which was available in the USSR at the time the decision was made to resume work on uranium, was obtained both through the channels of the NKVD intelligence and through the channels of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU GSh) of the Red Army.

In May 1942, the leadership of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff informed the Academy of Sciences of the USSR about the presence of reports of work abroad on the problem of using atomic energy for military purposes and asked to be informed whether this problem currently has a real practical basis. The answer to this request in June 1942 was given by V. G. Khlopin, who noted that for Last year in scientific literature there are almost no publications related to the solution of the problem of the use of atomic energy.

Official letter People's Commissar Internal Affairs L.P. Beria addressed to I.V. Stalin with information about the work on the use of atomic energy for military purposes abroad, proposals for organizing these works in the USSR and secret acquaintance with the NKVD materials of prominent Soviet specialists, the versions of which were prepared by employees Back in late 1941 - early 1942, the NKVD was sent to I.V. Stalin only in October 1942, after the adoption of the GKO order to resume work on uranium in the USSR.

Soviet intelligence had detailed information about the work on the creation of an atomic bomb in the United States, which came from specialists who sympathized with the USSR, in particular, Klaus Fuchs, Theodor Hall, Georges Koval and David Gringlas. However, according to some, a letter addressed to Stalin in early 1943 by the Soviet physicist G. Flerov, who managed to explain the essence of the problem in a popular way, was of decisive importance. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that G. N. Flerov's work on the letter to Stalin was not completed and it was not sent.

Launch of the nuclear project

It was adopted just a month and a half after the launch of the US Manhattan Project. It prescribed:

The order provided for the organization for this purpose at the USSR Academy of Sciences of a special laboratory of the atomic nucleus, the creation of laboratory facilities for the separation of uranium isotopes and the conduct of a complex of experimental work. The order obligated the Council of People's Commissars of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to provide the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in Kazan with a room of 500 square meters. m to accommodate the laboratory of the atomic nucleus and living space for 10 researchers.

Work on the creation of the atomic bomb

On February 11, 1943, GKO resolution No. 2872ss was adopted on the start practical work to build the atomic bomb. The general leadership was entrusted to the Deputy Chairman of the GKO, V. M. Molotov, who, in turn, appointed I. Kurchatov as the head of the atomic project (his appointment was signed on March 10). The information received through intelligence channels facilitated and accelerated the work of Soviet scientists.

On April 12, 1943, Academician A. A. Baikov, vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, signed an order on the creation of Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Kurchatov was appointed Head of the Laboratory.

GKO Decree No. 5582ss of April 8, 1944 ordered the People's Commissariat of the Chemical Industry (M. G. Pervukhina) to design in 1944 a heavy water production plant and a plant for the production of uranium hexafluoride (raw material for plants for the separation of uranium isotopes), and Narodny non-ferrous metallurgy commissariat (P. F. Lomako) - to ensure the production of 500 kg of metallic uranium at a pilot plant in 1944, to build a workshop for the production of metallic uranium by January 1, 1945 and to supply Laboratory No. 2 in 1944 with tens of tons of high-quality graphite blocks.

post-war period

After the occupation of Germany, a special group was created in the USA, the purpose of which was to prevent the USSR from seizing any data on the German atomic project. She also captured German specialists who were not needed by the United States, who already had their own bomb. On April 15, 1945, the American technical commission organized the removal of uranium raw materials from Stassfurt, and within 5-6 days all the uranium was removed along with the documentation related to it; the Americans also completely removed the equipment from the mine in Saxony, where uranium was mined.

Beria reported this to Stalin, who, however, did not raise a fuss; in the future, "lack of interest in uranium" and determined the figure of "10-15 years", which analysts reported to the US president about the estimated time frame for the development of an atomic bomb in the USSR. Later, this mine was restored, and the Wismuth joint venture was organized, which employed German specialists.

However, the NKVD still managed to extract several tons of low-enriched uranium at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute.

On July 24, 1945, in Potsdam, US President Truman informed Stalin that the United States "now has a weapon of extraordinary destructive power." According to Churchill's memoirs, Stalin smiled, but did not become interested in the details, from which Churchill concluded that he did not understand anything and was not aware of the events. Some modern researchers believe that this was blackmail. That same evening, Stalin instructed Molotov to talk with Kurchatov about speeding up work on the atomic project.

On August 20, 1945, to manage the atomic project, the GKO created a Special Committee with emergency powers, headed by L.P. Beria. Under the Special Committee, an executive body was created - the First Main Directorate under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (PGU). People's Commissar for Armaments B. L. Vannikov was appointed head of the PGU. Numerous enterprises and institutions from other departments were transferred to the PGU, including the scientific and technical department of intelligence, the Main Directorate of Camps for Industrial Construction of the NKVD (GULPS) and the Main Directorate of Camps for Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises of the NKVD (GULGMP) (with a total of 293 thousand prisoners). Stalin's directive obliged PGU to ensure the creation of atomic bombs, uranium and plutonium, in 1948.

On September 28, 1945, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the additional involvement of scientific institutions, individual scientists and other specialists in the work on the use of intra-atomic energy" was adopted.

In the annex to the document, a list of institutions of the atomic project was given (number 10 was the Physical-Technical Institute of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and its director K. D. Sinelnikov).

The first priority was to organize industrial production plutonium-239 and uranium-235. To solve the first problem, it was necessary to create experimental, and then industrial nuclear reactors, the construction of radiochemical and special metallurgical shops. To solve the second problem, the construction of a plant for the separation of uranium isotopes by the diffusion method was launched.

The solution of these problems turned out to be possible as a result of the creation of industrial technologies, the organization of production and the development of the necessary large quantities pure metallic uranium, uranium oxide, uranium hexafluoride, other uranium compounds, high purity graphite and a number of other special materials, the creation of a complex of new industrial units and devices. The insufficient volume of uranium ore mining and the production of uranium concentrates in the USSR during this period was compensated by trophy raw materials and products of uranium enterprises of the countries of Eastern Europe with which the USSR entered into relevant agreements.

In 1945, hundreds of German scientists who were related to the nuclear problem were brought from Germany to the USSR on a voluntary-compulsory basis. Most of them (about 300 people) were brought to Sukhumi and secretly placed in the former estates of Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich and the millionaire Smetsky (Sinop and Agudzery sanatoriums). Equipment was taken to the USSR from the German Institute of Chemistry and Metallurgy, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Physics, Siemens electrical laboratories, and the Physical Institute of the German Post Office. Three of the four German cyclotrons, powerful magnets, electron microscopes, oscilloscopes, high voltage transformers, ultra-precise instruments were brought to the USSR. In November 1945, the Directorate of Special Institutes (9th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR) was created as part of the NKVD of the USSR to manage the work on the use of German specialists.

Sanatorium "Sinop" was called "Object" A "" - it was led by Baron Manfred von Ardenne. "Agudzers" became "Object" G "" - it was headed by Gustav Hertz. Outstanding scientists worked at objects A and G - Nikolaus Riehl, Max Vollmer, who built the first heavy water production plant in the USSR, Peter Thyssen, designer for uranium separation Max Steenbeck and owner of the first Western patent for a centrifuge Gernot Zippe. On the basis of objects "A" and "G", the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology was later created.

In 1945, the Government of the USSR made the following major decisions:

• on the creation on the basis of the Kirov Plant (Leningrad) of two special experimental design bureaus designed to develop equipment for the production of uranium enriched in the isotope 235 by the gaseous diffusion method;
• on the start of construction in the Middle Urals (near the village of Verkh-Neyvinsky) of a diffusion plant for the production of enriched uranium-235;
• on the organization of a laboratory for work on the creation of heavy water reactors on natural uranium;
• on the choice of a site and the start of construction in the South Urals of the country's first enterprise for the production of plutonium-239.

The structure of the enterprise in the South Urals was to include:

• uranium-graphite reactor on natural (natural) uranium (Plant "A");
• radiochemical production for the separation of plutonium-239 from natural (natural) uranium irradiated in the reactor (plant "B");
• chemical and metallurgical production for the production of high-purity metallic plutonium (Plant "B").

Construction of Chelyabinsk-40

For the construction of the first enterprise in the USSR for the production of plutonium for military purposes, a site was chosen in the Southern Urals near the location of the ancient Ural cities of Kyshtym and Kasli. Site selection surveys were carried out in the summer of 1945; in October 1945, the Government Commission recognized the expediency of placing the first industrial reactor on the southern shore of Lake Kyzyl-Tash, and choosing a peninsula on the southern shore of Lake Irtyash for a residential area.

On the site of the selected construction site, over time, a whole complex of industrial enterprises, buildings and structures was erected, interconnected by a network of automobile and railways, heat and power supply system, industrial water supply and sewerage. AT different time the secret city was called differently, but the most famous name is "Sorokovka" or Chelyabinsk-40. At present, the industrial complex, originally named plant No. 817, is called the Mayak production association, and the city on the shore of Lake Irtyash, where Mayak workers and their families live, was named Ozyorsk.

In November 1945, geological surveys began at the selected site, and from the beginning of December, the first builders began to arrive.

The first head of construction (1946-1947) was Ya. D. Rappoport, later he was replaced by Major General M. M. Tsarevsky. The chief construction engineer was V. A. Saprykin, the first director of the future enterprise was P. T. Bystrov (from April 17, 1946), who was replaced by E. P. Slavsky (from July 10, 1947), and then B. G Muzrukov (since December 1, 1947). I. V. Kurchatov was appointed scientific director of the plant.

Construction of Arzamas-16

From the end of 1945, a search began for a place to place a secret facility, which would later be called KB-11. Vannikov instructed to inspect plant No. 550, located in the village of Sarov, and on April 1, 1946, the village was chosen as the location of the first Soviet nuclear center, later known as Arzamas-16. Yu. B. Khariton said that he personally flew around on an airplane and inspected the sites proposed for placing a secret object, and he liked the location of Sarov - a rather deserted area, there is infrastructure (railroad, production) and not very far from Moscow.

On April 9, 1946, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted important decisions concerning the organization of work on the USSR atomic project.

Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 803-325ss “Issues of the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR” provided for a change in the structure of the PSU and the unification of the Technical and Engineering and Technical Councils of the Special Committee into a single Scientific and Technical Council as part of the PSU. B. L. Vannikov was appointed Chairman of the Scientific and Technical Council of PSU, and I. V. Kurchatov and M. G. Pervukhin were appointed Vice-Chairmen of the Scientific and Technical Council. On December 1, 1949, I. V. Kurchatov became the chairman of the Scientific and Technical Council of PSU.

By Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 805-327ss "Questions of Laboratory No. 2", sector No. 6 of this Laboratory was transformed into Design Bureau No. 11 at Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences for the development of the design and manufacture of prototypes of jet engines (the code name for atomic bombs).

The resolution provided for the deployment of KB-11 in the area of ​​​​the village of Sarova on the border of the Gorky region and the Mordovian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (now the city of Sarov, Nizhny Novgorod region, formerly known as Arzamas-16). P. M. Zernov was appointed head of KB-11, and Yu. B. Khariton was appointed chief designer. The construction of KB-11 on the basis of plant No. 550 in the village of Sarov was entrusted to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. For carrying out all construction work, a special Building company- Construction Department No. 880 of the NKVD of the USSR. Since April 1946, the entire personnel of plant No. 550 was enlisted as workers and employees of Construction Department No. 880.

Products

Development of the design of atomic bombs

Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1286-525ss "On the plan for the deployment of KB-11 at Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences" defined the first tasks of KB-11: the creation under the scientific supervision of Laboratory No. 2 (Academician I. V. Kurchatov) of atomic bombs, conventionally named in the decree "Jet engines C", in two versions - RDS-1 and RDS-2.

Tactical and technical specifications for the design of the RDS-1 and RDS-2 were to be developed by July 1, 1946, and the designs of their main components - by July 1, 1947. The fully manufactured RDS-1 bomb was to be presented for state tests for an explosion when installed on the ground by January 1, 1948, in an aviation version - by March 1, 1948, and the RDS-2 bomb - by June 1, 1948 and January 1, 1949, respectively. be carried out in parallel with the organization in KB-11 of special laboratories and the deployment of these laboratories. Such tight deadlines and the organization of parallel work also became possible due to the receipt in the USSR of some intelligence data on American atomic bombs.

Research laboratories and design units of KB-11 began to deploy their activities directly in Arzamas-16 in the spring of 1947. In parallel, the first production workshops of pilot plants No. 1 and No. 2 were created.

Nuclear reactors

The first experimental nuclear reactor F-1 in the USSR, which was built in Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was successfully launched on December 25, 1946.

On November 6, 1947, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. M. Molotov, made a statement regarding the secret of the atomic bomb, saying that "this secret has long ceased to exist." This statement meant that the Soviet Union had already discovered the secret of atomic weapons, and they had these weapons at their disposal. US scientific circles regarded this statement by V. M. Molotov as a bluff, believing that the Russians could master atomic weapons no earlier than 1952.

In less than two years, the building of the first nuclear industrial reactor "A" of plant No. 817 was ready, and work began on the installation of the reactor itself. The physical launch of the reactor "A" took place at 00:30 on June 18, 1948, and on June 19 the reactor was brought to design capacity.

On December 22, 1948, the radiochemical plant "B" received the first products from a nuclear reactor. At Plant B, the plutonium produced in the reactor was separated from uranium and radioactive fission products. All radiochemical processes for Plant B were developed at the Radium Institute under the guidance of Academician V. G. Khlopin. A. Z. Rothschild was the general designer and chief engineer of the plant “B” project, and Ya. I. Zilberman was the chief technologist. B. A. Nikitin, Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was the supervisor of the start-up of Plant B.

The first batch of finished products (plutonium concentrate, consisting mainly of plutonium and lanthanum fluorides) was received in the refining department of Plant B in February 1949.

Obtaining weapons-grade plutonium

The plutonium concentrate was transferred to plant "B", which was intended for the production of high-purity plutonium metal and products from it.

The main contribution to the development of technology and design of plant "V" was made by: A. A. Bochvar, I. I. Chernyaev, A. S. Zaimovsky, A. N. Volsky, A. D. Gelman, V. D. Nikolsky, N P. Aleksakhin, P. Ya. Belyaev, L. R. Dulin, A. L. Tarakanov, etc.

In August 1949, Plant B produced high-purity metallic plutonium parts for the first atomic bomb.

Tests

The successful test of the first Soviet atomic bomb was carried out on August 29, 1949 at the constructed test site in the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan. It was kept secret.

On September 3, 1949, an aircraft of the US Special Meteorological Intelligence Service took air samples in the Kamchatka region, and then American specialists found isotopes in them, which indicated that a nuclear explosion had been carried out in the USSR.